On Sun, May 03, 2020 at 03:59:22AM -0400, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
Among other things, it means that programs potentially have to have special-casing in the error handlers, which are *already* code that doesn't get fully tested in most cases.
Why is that a bad thing?
The goal is to not break existing userspace programs. If the kernel started making up new error numbers for every new way it comes up with preventing you from doing something, userspace programs would not like that at all.
SElinux is an addon. I have no problem checking for seerrno or ESEPERM for its specific errors.
And do you want to check for all of the other different security models that Valdis listed? What about the 10 new ones that are coming in the next 2 years? After that? All that matters to your program is you were not allowed access to that resource, it doesn't matter what type of kernel feature/option caused that to happen. thanks, greg k-h